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NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE: REPLY TO REDMAYNE
Ronald J. Allen* & Brian Leiter"
2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 885

In our article, NaturalizedEpistemology and the Law of Evidence,' we
sought to provide a brief but philosophically sophisticated introduction "to
important recent developments in epistemology" and "to show... how these
developments provide a conceptual foundation for some familiar approaches
to problems from the law of evidence." 2 Our motivations for doing so were
complex, but included both highlighting and explaining for the legal academy
the rejection of post-modem epistemology by most contemporary
philosophers, and the implications of that rejection for the study of evidence.
We had, thus, both general philosophical and highly practical goals in mind.
Michael Redmayne appears to take us to task for the inadequacies of our
philosophical presentation, and further suggests that the philosophy is of no
import in any event.
With respect, we think that it is not our original presentation but
Redmayne's understanding of modem epistemology that is in error, and we
think further that his error may be instructively elaborated and explained to
advance our first goal of introducing certain philosophical concepts to the
legal audience.
Whether an improved understanding of the relevant
philosophical concepts will in any fashion improve the field of evidence, or
any other field, we leave to the reader's imagination and future developments.
Indeed, as we said in our original article, "[f]or the great bulk of evidentiary
scholars . . . this paper merely solidifies the ground beneath their feet."3
Nonetheless, we remain hopeful that the solidification is of some significance,
even if only in assuring evidence scholars that the pursuit of truth is not some
silly quixotic activity that only the uninformed would undertake with a
straight face. Surprisingly, when one gets to Redmayne's discussions of
specific issues, the methodology he employs could be taken straight out of our
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recommendations, although not for the reason he advances; a critical point that
we return to below."
We briefly elaborate these two points here. We first correct Redmayne's
philosophical mistakes and then discuss his apparent methodological approach
to evidence problems, showing it to be continuous with the lessons we tried
to impart in our original paper. Before doing so, however, we wish to express
our appreciation for his having spent considerable time on our original article.
All of us agree that the issues under consideration are deserving of careful and
sustained study, and that is precisely why we will use his critique as the
vehicle for further correcting some possible misunderstandings about the
relevant philosophical concepts and their implications.
Redmayne's argument gets misdirected right from the start. Although
he professes to disown the "tendentious" method of "proceed[ing] by way of
definitional fiat," 5 plainly his argument about the relevance of Alvin
Goldman's program in naturalized epistemology to evidence scholarship
amounts to nothing more than stipulative definitions backed by some selective
citations of philosophers who (more-or-less) endorse his definitions.'
Redmayne talks about "the core concerns of epistemology,"'7 "the central
epistemological questions revolving round the definitions of knowledge," 8
"the sort of abstract and general analysis characteristic of philosophy," 9 and
the "questions ... traditionally addressed by epistemology;"' 0 but how he
decided what was "core," "central", "characteristic" and "traditional," except
by stipulation and citation, is left to the imagination. Redmayne's conclusion
that "references to naturalized epistemology in Allen and Leiter's article are
not doing any important work" is premised on just these unelaborated and
"tendentious" claims.I
Fortunately, this is clearest in Redmayne's central challenge that
Goldman is not really "any sort of naturalist" since "[h]is naturalism only
emerges when we move beyond the central questions of epistemology.., to

4.

See Mike Redmayne, Rationality,Naturalism, andEvidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST.

L.REV. 849, 853.
5.

Id. at 853.

6. See, e.g., ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION (1986); ALVIN I.
GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD (1999) [hereinafter GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE].

7. Redmayne, supra note 4, at 850.
8. Id. at 853.
9. Id. The naturalist challenge, of course, is precisely to whether such analysis can
proceed except in tandem with empirical science.
10. Id. Redmayne may be closest to the mark on what is "traditional," but that
invocation is obviouslyquestion-begging against the naturalist challenge to the epistemological
tradition.
11. Id.
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ask: What methods of inquiry are likely to result in our acquiring
knowledge."' 2 Redmayne thinks the "central" questions "revolv[e] round the
definitions of knowledge" and not around "[h]ow we should go about
acquiring knowledge."' 3 The main argument he offers bears quoting:
Most epistemology does not focus on inquiry. There may be a good reason for this,
in that questions about inquiry are not obviously amenable to the sort of abstract and
general analysis characteristic of philosophy. Now it would be tendentious to proceed
by way of definitional fiat, asserting that questions about inquiry are not really
epistemological at all. But it is important to understand that the Goldman/
Allen/Leiter brand of naturalized epistemology is expansionist. Its claim to be
naturalistic only comes into play where questions not traditionally addressed by
epistemology are concerned. 14

Redmayne's claims about epistemology are at best highly misleading and
at worst simply wrong. Fundamentally, no epistemologists are interested in
a "definition" of knowledge; none take themselves to be in competition with
lexicographers. Philosophers are interested in an analysis of the concept of
knowledge, not in the regulation of linguistic practice, 5 and many are
interested in inquiry. In a footnote, Redmayne acknowledges Richard
Swinburne as an epistemologist interested in inquiry, as though he were the
exception that proved the contrary rule. 6 However, he neglects that
epistemology since Descartes in the seventeenth century (who wrote on optics,
physiology and geometry, among other "applied" subjects) through Carnap in
the twentieth century has been concerned with vindicating the methods of
inquiry characteristic of the modem physical sciences. So, to assert that
"questions about inquiry are not really epistemological at all" is not only
tendentious but flatly wrong. 7 Epistemology is about inquiry, about the ways
we acquire what we take to be "knowledge," about which ways are sound and
reliable and which are not.'"

12. Id. at 852-53.
13. Redmayne, supra note 4, at 853. Redmayne dismissively calls Allen and Leiter's
process an "inquiry." See id.
14. Id.
15. There are reasons, to be sure, to think they fail. See generally Jonathan M.
Weinberg et al., Norinativity and Epistemic Intuitions, 29 PHIL. ToPics 429 (2001). But this
conclusion leaves lexicography untouched. See id.
16. See Redmayne, supra note 4, at 853 n.17.
17. Id. at 853.
18. Philip Kitcher describes as the "traditional" questions of epistemology the
following: "What is knowledge? What kinds of knowledge (if any) are possible? What
methods should we use for attaining knowledge, or, at least, for improving the epistemic
qualities of our beliefs?" Philip Kitcher, The NaturalistsReturn, 101 PHIL. REV. 53, 56 (1992).
Notice that what Redmayne calls "inquiry" is on Kitcher's list of the three main "traditional"
questions of epistemology. See id.
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Perhaps all Redmayne means is that, while most epistemology is deeply
interested in the way we acquire knowledge (in "inquiry"), much modem
epistemology has been concerned only to vindicate-to lay the foundation
for-pre-existing methods of inquiry (e.g., those of the sciences), rather than
to develop new methods of inquiry. Even this more muted point is difficult
to support. The seminal-or at least, most famous-text of late twentieth
century Anglo-American epistemology prior to the naturalistic revolution 9
shows that even this reformulated claim is too strong. Roderick Chisholm was
deeply interested in formulating the methods of inquiry for individual
knowers, and thus would be banished from the epistemological canon
according to Redmayne. But Chisholm and his many progeny to one side, it
is true that there are other major figures in epistemology in the modem period
who have had only tangential interests, if that, in the development of methods
of inquiry.
What does this show? Plainly nothing of any philosophical, as opposed
to "classificatory," interest. For thousands of years, philosophers thought, for
a variety of reasons, that the empirical facts did not bear on the question of
what counts as knowledge or justification. Naturalists think the empirical
facts matter, in one way or another. Why Redmayne wants to deny that this
is (a) naturalism, or (b) relevant to the evaluation of evidentiary rules, is, in
the end, utterly mysterious. Evidence scholarship would be better served by
asking the questions that we argued deserve asking than engaging in
disputations about terminology. In doing so, it would be in harmony with
much of modem epistemological thought.
Are we now being "tendentious"? We think not. In the centennary issue
of the PhilosophicalReview, the premier journal of Anglophone philosophy,
Philip Kitcher, contributed a now-classic essay on the naturalistic revolution
in philosophy, especially epistemology. 0 As Kitcher noted, Frege is the arch
anti-naturalist in philosophy precisely because of his "opposition to what he
perceived as intrusions from psychology or biology."2 ' Kitcher also notes the
"several kinds of naturalism" that have overtaken contemporary philosophy
"all share an opposition to the Frege-Wittgenstein conception of a pure
philosophy above (or below?) the special disciplines," i.e., the sciences.22
Indeed, the two distinguishing features of the anti-naturalist approach,
according to Kitcher, are the pursuit of "epistemological questions in an
apsychologistic way-logic, not psychology, is the proper idiom for
epistemological discussion" and the view of "philosophical reflection as a

19.
20.
21.
22.

See RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966).
See Kitcher, supra note 18, at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id.at 55.
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priori," i.e., prior to experience or empirical evidence.23 Naturalists like
Goldman repudiate both claims, and thus are usefully, and quite intelligibly,
marked as naturalists-and that, in a nutshell, is why (as we argued) naturalized
epistemology is relevant to evidence scholarship.
Yet, Redmayne also has "another reason for thinking that the references
to naturalized epistemology... are not doing any important work."24 Namely,
that Goldman's social epistemology-which Redmayne appears to concede
is quite relevant25-is not really part of naturalized epistemology. Once again,
we enter the realm of pointless terminological quibbles. Would we be able to
avoid this dispute simply by retitling our essay? 26
It is of course true that Goldman's program in Knowledge in a Social
World is concerned only with what Goldman himself calls the "weak" sense
of knowledge, that is, mere true belief.2
(Redmayne fails to note this
qualification-"weak'"-which is introduced by Goldman.) Yet even
Goldman takes this to be a radical departure from "the Cartesian image of
inquiry as an activity of isolated thinkers," since it emphasizes instead the
need to attend to "the interpersonal and institutional contexts in which most
knowledge endeavors are actually undertaken."28 Goldman is also equally
clear that "most of the philosophical literature" is concerned with knowledge
in a different sense: namely, as true belief plus some other condition (having
to do with justification).29 Goldman, of course, thinks the other condition
must be cashed out in terms of empirical facts about the causal mechanisms
that reliably produce true belief. That means, quite obviously one would have
thought, that the final program of social epistemology-which would
necessarily have to attend to the social mechanisms by which belief is
(causally) inculcated-would be naturalistic precisely because it makes the
existence of "knowledge" turn on a posteriorifacts.
Since Redmayne apparently admits the relevance of social epistemology,
and has merely "tendentious" definitional reasons for excluding social
epistemology from the domain of naturalized epistemology, it appears that he

23.

Id. at 57.

24.
25.

Redmayne, supra note 4, at 853.
See generally GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 6 (discussing the laws of

evidence in chapter four and seven).
26. An earlier version of the paper was in fact called Social Epistemology and the Law
of Evidence, though it is hard to see why a change in title should occasion a substantive

criticism.
27.

See GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 6, at 24.

28.
29.

Id. at vii.
Id. at 23.

Michigan State Law Review

[Vol. 4:885

has failed to show that naturalized epistemology is "not doing any important
work"3 in our approach to evidence law.3
Now Redmayne is also unsympathetic to Quine's radical replacement
naturalism-he is not alone in this, obviously-and takes issue with Leiter's
sympathy for Quine in other writings of his. Since the radical Quinean
program isn't at issue in Allen & Leiter's joint work, we will confine
discussion of this aspect of his paper to a (lengthy) footnote.32

30. Redmayne, supra note 4, at 853.
31. One other clarification needs to be given. Our claim that "the only way to assess
instrumental claims is to do so empirically, that is, by finding out what means really bring about
what ends" is not, contra Redmayne, a kind of replacement naturalism that "is not easy to
reconcile with Goldman's work on social epistemology." Allen & Leiter, supranote 1,at 1499;
see Redmayne, supra note 4, at 860. Goldman's entire project in Knowledge in a Social World
is an exercise in ought-implies-can. See GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 6. This is not
replacement naturalism, since it does not involve replacing the normative question about the
relationship between sensory inputs and theoretical outputs with a descriptive question about
the causal connection between these two.
32. Redmayne observes that Quine argues for replacement naturalism based on the
failure of foundationalism. See Redmayne, supra note 4, at 855-56. However, Redmayne
complains this "is only one of several possible theories ofepistemic justification." Id. at 855.
Redmayne mentions, e.g., coherentism (citing BonJour circa 1985), reliabilism (Goldman), and
foundherentism (Haack), among others. See id. at 855 nn. 28, 30 & 31. Among "possible"
theories, of course, this list seems rather truncated. See id. It omits: divine inspirationalism (all
genuine knowledge derives from divine inspiration), Leiterian inspirationalism (all genuine
knowledge derives from inspiration from Leiter), lunatic veritism (all genuine knowledge
consists only of true beliefs, however acquired), and Potterian coherentism (all genuine
knowledge coheres with claims in the Harry Potter novels). Now, while these views are
possible, they are also silly, but their possibility does underline the fact that what motivates
Quine's move from the failure of foundationalism to replacement naturalism is precisely the
unpromising nature of the "possible" alternatives to foundationalism. BonJour, for example,
recognizing this, abandoned coherentism long ago (this goes unnoted by Redmayne), and
Haack's idiosyncratic view has the vices ofboth the coherentism (that BonJour abandoned) and
the foundationalist tradition attacked by Quine. Redmayne has not even attempted to show that
these views are serious competitors, and the mere fact that their authors are well-known does
not make them such. (Goldman's reliabilism, precisely because it parts company with the
internalism about justification characteristic of the foundationalist tradition that Quine attacks,
has better prospects, but would presumably fall prey, in Quinenan eyes, to skepticism about
conceptual analysis.)
Redmayne also takes issue with Leiter's claim that the Neurath's boat metaphor for our
epistemological situation-the idea that in epistemological matters, we are in the same situation
as sailors who want to rebuild their ship while still at sea-supports the claim that, in the absence
of foundationalism, epistemology can do no more than describe our actual epistemological
practices. See id. at 856-57. Redmayne's rejoinder to Leiter bears quoting:
The notion of changing planks surely suggests reflection and attempts to critically reorder our theories. What the boat metaphor does suggest is that we have no infallible
foundations-any one of the planks may need to be replaced at some stage.
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Once the philosophical concepts are straightened out, it becomes plain
that much of current evidentiary scholarship is quite compatible with modem
naturalized epistemology. Moreover, evidence scholars should not be made
uneasy that their pursuit of propositions with truth value is somehow quaint
and out of step with modem relativistic thinking that consigns questions of
truth to either the trash bin or pure politics. Not surprisingly, when
Redmayne, who is a distinguished evidentiary scholar in his own right,
actually analyzes specific legal questions (inferences from silence and the use
of DNA evidence), he does so in ways perfectly countenanced by our
approach. He carefully analyzes the relevant problem, searches for data,
considers its reliability and relevance, and so on.
What, then, is the problem? Is there nothing here but terminological
disputes with no practical significance? We think not. Indeed, we think
Redmayne's paper is a perfect example of the possible significance of our
original effort to solidify the ground beneath the feet of evidence scholars.
Having convinced himself that our explication of naturalized epistemology
was either wrong or irrelevant to evidence scholarship, or both, Redmayne

Nevertheless, there is a foundationalist point here, in that in our theorizing at a
particular point in time we are assuming that certain planks provide a privileged
epistemological position; fallible though they may be, we will not give them up while
we are standing on them.
Id. at 857. Unfortunately, Redmayne has here conflated two distinct perspectives: the
perspective of the epistemologist who is wondering what can be said about truth justification;
and the perspective of those in the boat (e.g., working scientists) who are investigating what is
true and what is justified. The whole point of the Neurath's boat metaphor-as is abundantly
clear in both Quine and Leiter-is that those in the boat, of course, privilege certain theoretical
positions and treat them as inferentially foundational in constructing their theories of the true
and justified. The claim that there is nothing left but descriptive sociology if (what Redmayne
calls infallible) foundationalism fails is apoint about the perspective of the epistemologist. To
be sure, the epistemologist can describe the criteria of truth and justification the people on the
boat use, but that is just descriptive sociology, a descriptive sociology that confers no metasanction on those criteria. As Redmayne puts it (not realizing, apparently, that this concedes
the point), "at aparticular point in time we are assuming that certain planks provide a privileged
epistemological position." Redmayne, supra note 4, at 857. Indeed we are, and there is nothing
in the Quinean program to preclude us from describing what planks those are at any particular
point in time. The same applies to Redmayne's point that, following Quine's "engineering"
approach to questions of normativity, we might try "to develop more general and abstract
epistemic principles.., which would pick out common elements in the examples" of fruitful
epistemic principles that Redmayne describes. Id. at 859.
Now Redmayne is correct that predictive success is assigned a great deal of weight by Quine,
and we might fairly ask, as Redmayne does, "[w]hy should we be impressed by prediction?"
Id. at 857. Quine hasn't a clear answer to that question, but Leiter attempts to supply one, in
a Quinean spirit, in an article to which we refer the interested reader. See Brian Leiter, Why
Quine Is Not a Postmodernist,50 SMU L. REV. 1739, 1750 (1997).
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turned to what philosophical perspectives might better serve our interests, and
he found... nothing. He briefly flirts with probabilism, although it is hard to
see "probabilism" as a philosophical perspective (a task not simplified by his
failure to be clear about what he means by the term). It is, as we understand
his use of the term, a tool that all rational individuals will employ from time
to time, but even probabilism is a disappointment as "we have reason to
suspect that sometimes these criteria should be rejected." 3 What is to be
done? "It seems that the only good way to manage the problem is, broadly
speaking, to draw on our intuitions."34
We do not believe Redmayne really believes this; but if he does, we
would recommend yet another reading of our original article. The naturalistic
turn in epistemology came about in no small measure because of the failure
of formal theories (elaborated intuitions) to achieve the goal of justifying
assertions of knowledge. Justification, in other words, seemed not to be a
matter of just consulting one's intuitions, and the effort to justify assertions
of knowledge in that manner came to be perceived as the problem rather than
the solution. In order to gain knowledge, one needs not just to think but to
investigate. The two go hand in hand, as we tried to elaborate in our original
article, and ironically as Redmayne's own discussions of practical issues
demonstrate as well. He is not relying on his "intuitions" in his discussions
of silence and DNA; he largely is considering the evidence and its
implications. He is, in short, working well within the modem tradition of
naturalized epistemology.

33.
34.

Redmayne, supra note 4, at 867.
Id.

